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Differential Power Analysis on the Apple A4 Processor
Mar. 10, 2015
[edit] Presentation Abstracts - Tuesday, 15
March
[edit] (SHNF) Differential iner Analysis an the Apple A4
Precessnr
Presenters: and (U) The Apple A4 prccesscr ccntains an
cn-bcard, AES key called the Glcbal ID that is believed tc be shared all current
"iEIevices". This GID key is used tc un?wrap the keys that the ?rmware ccde
stared in system ncn-vclatile memcry. Currently, the cnly way tc examine ccde is tc gain
executic-n thrcugh an ewlcitable security ?aw. I-Icwever, Apple is quick tc address these ?aws
with each new release cf ?rmware and hardware.
The Inte?igence Ccmmunity is highly dependent an a very sma]l number cf security ?aws,
many cf which are public, which Apple eventually patches. The presentaticn will discuss a
methcd tc ncninvasively extract the GID key the A4 siliccn. If successful, it wculd enable
and analysis cf the beat ?rmware far vulnerabilities, and develcpment cf asscciated explcits the
entire Ari?based prcduct?line, which includes the iPhcne? A, the iPcd tcuch? and the iPath.
Pcwer analysis techniques have prcven effective in extracting hardware resident
such as keys, secure ncninvasively thrcugh side?channel
We have wcrked tc develcp an envircnment within the iPhcne 4 that assists in
differential pcwer analysis attacks against the A4 prccesscr while preserving the
?lncticnality cf the device. We have studied emissicns that during AES
cperaticns with the intent cf extracting abcut the cn?chip AES keys. We will discuss the
used tc acquire varicus measurements the system and the we?ve made in
attempting tc extract the GID key the devices.
[edit] Presentation Abstracts - Tuesday, 15
March
[edit] (SHNF) Differential iner Analysis an the Apple A4
Precessnr
Presenters: and (U) The Apple A4 prccesscr ccntains an
cn-bcard, AES key called the Glcbal ID that is believed tc be shared all current
"iEIevices". This GID key is used tc un?wrap the keys that the ?rmware ccde
stared in system ncn-vclatile memcry. Currently, the cnly way tc examine ccde is tc gain
executic-n thrcugh an ewlcitable security ?aw. I-Icwever, Apple is quick tc address these ?aws
with each new release cf ?rmware and hardware.
The Inte?igence Ccmmunity is highly dependent an a very sma]l number cf security ?aws,
many cf which are public, which Apple eventually patches. The presentaticn will discuss a
methcd tc ncninvasively extract the GID key the A4 siliccn. If successful, it wculd enable
and analysis cf the beat ?rmware far vulnerabilities, and develcpment cf asscciated explcits the
entire Ari?based prcduct?line, which includes the iPhcne? A, the iPcd tcuch? and the iPath.
Pcwer analysis techniques have prcven effective in extracting hardware resident
such as keys, secure ncninvasively thrcugh side?channel
We have wcrked tc develcp an envircnment within the iPhcne 4 that assists in
differential pcwer analysis attacks against the A4 prccesscr while preserving the
?lncticnality cf the device. We have studied emissicns that during AES
cperaticns with the intent cf extracting abcut the cn?chip AES keys. We will discuss the
used tc acquire varicus measurements the system and the we?ve made in
attempting tc extract the GID key the devices.