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Differential Power Analysis on the Apple A4 Processor

Mar. 10, 2015

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[edit] Presentation Abstracts - Tuesday, 15 March [edit] (SHNF) Differential iner Analysis an the Apple A4 Precessnr Presenters: and (U) The Apple A4 prccesscr ccntains an cn-bcard, AES key called the Glcbal ID that is believed tc be shared all current "iEIevices". This GID key is used tc un?wrap the keys that the ?rmware ccde stared in system ncn-vclatile memcry. Currently, the cnly way tc examine ccde is tc gain executic-n thrcugh an ewlcitable security ?aw. I-Icwever, Apple is quick tc address these ?aws with each new release cf ?rmware and hardware. The Inte?igence Ccmmunity is highly dependent an a very sma]l number cf security ?aws, many cf which are public, which Apple eventually patches. The presentaticn will discuss a methcd tc ncninvasively extract the GID key the A4 siliccn. If successful, it wculd enable and analysis cf the beat ?rmware far vulnerabilities, and develcpment cf asscciated explcits the entire Ari?based prcduct?line, which includes the iPhcne? A, the iPcd tcuch? and the iPath. Pcwer analysis techniques have prcven effective in extracting hardware resident such as keys, secure ncninvasively thrcugh side?channel We have wcrked tc develcp an envircnment within the iPhcne 4 that assists in differential pcwer analysis attacks against the A4 prccesscr while preserving the ?lncticnality cf the device. We have studied emissicns that during AES cperaticns with the intent cf extracting abcut the cn?chip AES keys. We will discuss the used tc acquire varicus measurements the system and the we?ve made in attempting tc extract the GID key the devices.
[edit] Presentation Abstracts - Tuesday, 15 March [edit] (SHNF) Differential iner Analysis an the Apple A4 Precessnr Presenters: and (U) The Apple A4 prccesscr ccntains an cn-bcard, AES key called the Glcbal ID that is believed tc be shared all current "iEIevices". This GID key is used tc un?wrap the keys that the ?rmware ccde stared in system ncn-vclatile memcry. Currently, the cnly way tc examine ccde is tc gain executic-n thrcugh an ewlcitable security ?aw. I-Icwever, Apple is quick tc address these ?aws with each new release cf ?rmware and hardware. The Inte?igence Ccmmunity is highly dependent an a very sma]l number cf security ?aws, many cf which are public, which Apple eventually patches. The presentaticn will discuss a methcd tc ncninvasively extract the GID key the A4 siliccn. If successful, it wculd enable and analysis cf the beat ?rmware far vulnerabilities, and develcpment cf asscciated explcits the entire Ari?based prcduct?line, which includes the iPhcne? A, the iPcd tcuch? and the iPath. Pcwer analysis techniques have prcven effective in extracting hardware resident such as keys, secure ncninvasively thrcugh side?channel We have wcrked tc develcp an envircnment within the iPhcne 4 that assists in differential pcwer analysis attacks against the A4 prccesscr while preserving the ?lncticnality cf the device. We have studied emissicns that during AES cperaticns with the intent cf extracting abcut the cn?chip AES keys. We will discuss the used tc acquire varicus measurements the system and the we?ve made in attempting tc extract the GID key the devices.