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Kurdistan Regional Government

Aug. 31, 2014

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Page 1 from Kurdistan Regional Government
UK SECRET Kurdistan Regional Government The Kurds Those individuals who collectively could he called the Kurdish People People} are split actoss a series of countties. Ethnic Kurdhh populations exist in vatying numbers in Turkey, Iran, Iraq {findeLphpEItaq} and Sytia. The overall size of this group is estimated to number somewhere between 20-25 million. The largest grouping resides in south-eastem Turkey, where the estimated Kurdhh population is around 15 million. In Iran, there are another four to six million Kurds and, in Itaq, three to four million. However, it is only in Itaq where the ethnic Kutds curtently have any signi?cant degree of autonomy The Kur?sh militaty fotces known as peshmetga played a key tole in the ovetthrow of the former Iraqi govetnmenL Kutdistan The cun?ent as well as histotical sttength ofthe nationalist impulse amongst the Kutds, genetaliy, and those in Iraq specifically, should not he undetestimated. The dteam of a wider Kur?sh nation has been an aspitation of ethnic Kurds for genetations. A geogtaphical area called Kurdistan was ?rst noted in the 13th Centuty, but the Kutds have never really formed a coherent and unified state, having lived independently as trihes. Dver their histoty, numerous foreign powets [up to and including Saddam] have used the Kutds for their own devices. This has led two ideas to become enu?enched in the Kurdhh - the continual disunity arising from ttihalism and a perception of petpetual foreign hettayal of Kur?sh aspitations. These are still relevant even today when consideting Kurdhh aspirations towards statehood. Status of the EEG The Itaqi constitution declates that the Republic of Itaq has a fedetal system made up of a decenu?alised capital, legions and governotates, and local administtations. The status of the
UK SECRET Kurdistan Regional Government The Kurds Those individuals who collectively could he called the Kurdish People People} are split actoss a series of countties. Ethnic Kurdhh populations exist in vatying numbers in Turkey, Iran, Iraq {findeLphpEItaq} and Sytia. The overall size of this group is estimated to number somewhere between 20-25 million. The largest grouping resides in south-eastem Turkey, where the estimated Kurdhh population is around 15 million. In Iran, there are another four to six million Kurds and, in Itaq, three to four million. However, it is only in Itaq where the ethnic Kutds curtently have any signi?cant degree of autonomy The Kur?sh militaty fotces known as peshmetga played a key tole in the ovetthrow of the former Iraqi govetnmenL Kutdistan The cun?ent as well as histotical sttength ofthe nationalist impulse amongst the Kutds, genetaliy, and those in Iraq specifically, should not he undetestimated. The dteam of a wider Kur?sh nation has been an aspitation of ethnic Kurds for genetations. A geogtaphical area called Kurdistan was ?rst noted in the 13th Centuty, but the Kutds have never really formed a coherent and unified state, having lived independently as trihes. Dver their histoty, numerous foreign powets [up to and including Saddam] have used the Kutds for their own devices. This has led two ideas to become enu?enched in the Kurdhh - the continual disunity arising from ttihalism and a perception of petpetual foreign hettayal of Kur?sh aspitations. These are still relevant even today when consideting Kurdhh aspirations towards statehood. Status of the EEG The Itaqi constitution declates that the Republic of Itaq has a fedetal system made up of a decenu?alised capital, legions and governotates, and local administtations. The status of the
Page 2 from Kurdistan Regional Government
"Kurdistan Regional Government" as an autonomous region is already defined in the document [and provides a possible model for Iraq ?s future]. The region has its own flag and national anthem. Under the constitution, certain powers remain the exclusive preserve of the federal government; foreign policy and negotiation, national defence policy,financial and customs policies,standards, naturalization, the radio spectrum, and the mail. ?v?arious other powers and ?competences? are shared between the federal government and both the regional and provincial authorities. These include: the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields; formulating the "necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people?; organising customs; and formulating policy on health, the environment, and education. The two main KurdEh parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan have united to form an alliance with several smaller parties, and the Kurdish alliance has 53 deputies in the new Baghdad parliament, while the Kurdish Islamic Union has 5. PUK-leaderialal Talabani has been elected President of the new Iraqi administration, while KDP leader Massoud Barxani Massoud Barxani is President of the Kurdistan Regional GovernmenL Article 140 and the Disputed Areas In January EDGE the UN Special Representative to Iraq, Steffan de Mismra, persuaded the Kurds to agree to extend the deadline for the Article 140 referendum to June EDGE. As the new deadline approaches and prospects for a referendum remain highly unlikely, de Mistura reportedly announced in April in Arbil a three-stage plan for an alternative solution to the Kirkuk and disputed areas issue. This involves setIling the status of less contested disputed areas by district level consensus. The outcome will be used as a model for dealing with the more contentious Kirkuk status, without having to stage a referendum. Problems of Regionalism The constitutional privileging of regional legislation makes it more difficult for Baghdad to impose its will on regions. In the absence of a nationally-agreed hydrocarbons law, local authorities have the opportunity to strengthen de facto control. The KRG is already using its autonomous status to further its interests, passing its own Evil and Gas Law on E- August 200? which will enable the KRG to opt out of any future national oil contract and revenue-sharing agreements. In the absence of robust national hydrocarbons legislation, a new oil-rich region in the south could gain substantial control over its natural resources at the expense of the centre (and, therefore, provinces or regions which lack these resources]. The constitution?s speci?cin with regards to "oil and gas extracted from current ?elds? could also create problems overthe exploration and exploitation of fields which have either not been discovered yet, or which do not yet produce oil or gas. KurdEh leaders are keen supporters of federalism; whilst they will not be directly affected by the law on region formation, they are mindful of the indirect effects. The KRG currently stands alone as an autonomous region. By promoting regionalism in Arab areas of Iraq the Kurds hope to end the exceptional status, thereby cementing and even strengthening its autonomy. This, in turn, could be useful in gaining greater control over northern Iraq?s oil wealth. However, the regionalisation of predominantly Sunni provinces in central and western Iraq will depend on developing political and tribal dynamics, economic pressures, and the outcome of Article 140 and other territorial disputes. It is unclear at present how Article 140 and the region formation law will affect these disputed northern areas. Provincial boundaries may be redrawn, either formally or de facto, to take different regional solutions into account. If areas of Ninawah and Tamim
"Kurdistan Regional Government" as an autonomous region is already defined in the document [and provides a possible model for Iraq ?s future]. The region has its own flag and national anthem. Under the constitution, certain powers remain the exclusive preserve of the federal government; foreign policy and negotiation, national defence policy,financial and customs policies,standards, naturalization, the radio spectrum, and the mail. ?v?arious other powers and ?competences? are shared between the federal government and both the regional and provincial authorities. These include: the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields; formulating the "necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people?; organising customs; and formulating policy on health, the environment, and education. The two main KurdEh parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan have united to form an alliance with several smaller parties, and the Kurdish alliance has 53 deputies in the new Baghdad parliament, while the Kurdish Islamic Union has 5. PUK-leaderialal Talabani has been elected President of the new Iraqi administration, while KDP leader Massoud Barxani Massoud Barxani is President of the Kurdistan Regional GovernmenL Article 140 and the Disputed Areas In January EDGE the UN Special Representative to Iraq, Steffan de Mismra, persuaded the Kurds to agree to extend the deadline for the Article 140 referendum to June EDGE. As the new deadline approaches and prospects for a referendum remain highly unlikely, de Mistura reportedly announced in April in Arbil a three-stage plan for an alternative solution to the Kirkuk and disputed areas issue. This involves setIling the status of less contested disputed areas by district level consensus. The outcome will be used as a model for dealing with the more contentious Kirkuk status, without having to stage a referendum. Problems of Regionalism The constitutional privileging of regional legislation makes it more difficult for Baghdad to impose its will on regions. In the absence of a nationally-agreed hydrocarbons law, local authorities have the opportunity to strengthen de facto control. The KRG is already using its autonomous status to further its interests, passing its own Evil and Gas Law on E- August 200? which will enable the KRG to opt out of any future national oil contract and revenue-sharing agreements. In the absence of robust national hydrocarbons legislation, a new oil-rich region in the south could gain substantial control over its natural resources at the expense of the centre (and, therefore, provinces or regions which lack these resources]. The constitution?s speci?cin with regards to "oil and gas extracted from current ?elds? could also create problems overthe exploration and exploitation of fields which have either not been discovered yet, or which do not yet produce oil or gas. KurdEh leaders are keen supporters of federalism; whilst they will not be directly affected by the law on region formation, they are mindful of the indirect effects. The KRG currently stands alone as an autonomous region. By promoting regionalism in Arab areas of Iraq the Kurds hope to end the exceptional status, thereby cementing and even strengthening its autonomy. This, in turn, could be useful in gaining greater control over northern Iraq?s oil wealth. However, the regionalisation of predominantly Sunni provinces in central and western Iraq will depend on developing political and tribal dynamics, economic pressures, and the outcome of Article 140 and other territorial disputes. It is unclear at present how Article 140 and the region formation law will affect these disputed northern areas. Provincial boundaries may be redrawn, either formally or de facto, to take different regional solutions into account. If areas of Ninawah and Tamim
Page 3 from Kurdistan Regional Government
[including KirkuI-c] ate incorporated into the EEG we assume that provincial boundaties would have to be changed or some other solution devised to prevent populations legionalised within the EEG front obstructing the legionalisation of the tentainder of these provinces. Provincial elections could plajrr an intpottant role, especiallyr if aligned Sunni tribal movements perform well in neighbouring provinces.
[including KirkuI-c] ate incorporated into the EEG we assume that provincial boundaties would have to be changed or some other solution devised to prevent populations legionalised within the EEG front obstructing the legionalisation of the tentainder of these provinces. Provincial elections could plajrr an intpottant role, especiallyr if aligned Sunni tribal movements perform well in neighbouring provinces.