Documents
Saudi Arabia Information Paper
July 25, 2014
TOP 8 EUR ETHSIHNO FORM
Naticnal Security 3 April 2013
Agencyi'Central Security
Service
Paper
TD USA, SAU) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relaticnship with
Saudi Arabia
(U)
(TSHSIHN F) Since the ?rst Gulf War in 1001, NSAICSS has had a very limited
SIGINT relaticnship with the cf Saudi Arabia (KSA). The SIGINT
relaticnship has been sclely with the Ministry cf Defense, Radic Reccnnaissance
Department (MDD RRD) which is the ?rst ministry-level crganizaticns
that have a rcle in the defense and security cf the The NSAICSS
SIGINT relaticnship with the MOD RRD is a and challenging cne that,
after several years cf stagnaticn, is experiencing a pericd cf rejuvenaticn.
NSAICSS is in the prccess cf mcdernizing the MOD RRD High Frequency
Directicn Finding (HFDF) capability that assists in the mcnitcring cf Iranian
military threats tc KSA. Middle Eastl'Africa (M and
Ccunterterrcrism (CT) Prcduct Lines prcvide threat warning against terrcrist
targets and targets cf interest tc the KSA, speci?cally, intelligence related tc
Huthi ccn?icts alcng the Saudif?i?emen bcrder.
(TSHSIHREL TD USA, SAU) On 11 December 2012, the Directcr cf Naticnal
Intelligence (DNI) eapansicn cf NSA's Third Party SIGINT relaticnship
with Saudi Arabia tc include the Saudi Ministry cf lntericr?s (MIDI) Technical
Affairs Directcrate (TAD). Pricr tc receiving DNl?s cf the relaticnship and
under the auspices cf ClA?s relaticnship with the MDl?s Mabahith (General
Directcrate lnvestigaticns, equivalent tc FBI), NSA had been ccllabcrating
with TAD since February 2011 en a sensitive access initiative. This capability is
fccused an internal security and terrcrist activity an the Arabian Peninsula. ?Wlth
the cfthe Third Party SIGINT relaticnship, NSAICSS intends tc prcvide
direct analytic and technical tc TAD.
TD USA, Lastly, using the Fcreign Release Prccess,
NSAICSS shares threat warning and terrcrist lead aticn prcduced by the
Ccunterterrcrism Prcduct Line with the CIA Staticn in Riyadh tc pass tc ClA's
intelligence partner the KSA Ministry cf lntericr Directcrate cf lnvestigaticns,
Mabahith.
Derived Frcm: NSAICSSM 1-52
Dated: 20130403
Declassify Dn: 20330403
TOP
TOP 8 EUR ETHSIHNO FORM
Naticnal Security 3 April 2013
Agencyi'Central Security
Service
Paper
TD USA, SAU) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relaticnship with
Saudi Arabia
(U)
(TSHSIHN F) Since the ?rst Gulf War in 1001, NSAICSS has had a very limited
SIGINT relaticnship with the cf Saudi Arabia (KSA). The SIGINT
relaticnship has been sclely with the Ministry cf Defense, Radic Reccnnaissance
Department (MDD RRD) which is the ?rst ministry-level crganizaticns
that have a rcle in the defense and security cf the The NSAICSS
SIGINT relaticnship with the MOD RRD is a and challenging cne that,
after several years cf stagnaticn, is experiencing a pericd cf rejuvenaticn.
NSAICSS is in the prccess cf mcdernizing the MOD RRD High Frequency
Directicn Finding (HFDF) capability that assists in the mcnitcring cf Iranian
military threats tc KSA. Middle Eastl'Africa (M and
Ccunterterrcrism (CT) Prcduct Lines prcvide threat warning against terrcrist
targets and targets cf interest tc the KSA, speci?cally, intelligence related tc
Huthi ccn?icts alcng the Saudif?i?emen bcrder.
(TSHSIHREL TD USA, SAU) On 11 December 2012, the Directcr cf Naticnal
Intelligence (DNI) eapansicn cf NSA's Third Party SIGINT relaticnship
with Saudi Arabia tc include the Saudi Ministry cf lntericr?s (MIDI) Technical
Affairs Directcrate (TAD). Pricr tc receiving DNl?s cf the relaticnship and
under the auspices cf ClA?s relaticnship with the MDl?s Mabahith (General
Directcrate lnvestigaticns, equivalent tc FBI), NSA had been ccllabcrating
with TAD since February 2011 en a sensitive access initiative. This capability is
fccused an internal security and terrcrist activity an the Arabian Peninsula. ?Wlth
the cfthe Third Party SIGINT relaticnship, NSAICSS intends tc prcvide
direct analytic and technical tc TAD.
TD USA, Lastly, using the Fcreign Release Prccess,
NSAICSS shares threat warning and terrcrist lead aticn prcduced by the
Ccunterterrcrism Prcduct Line with the CIA Staticn in Riyadh tc pass tc ClA's
intelligence partner the KSA Ministry cf lntericr Directcrate cf lnvestigaticns,
Mabahith.
Derived Frcm: NSAICSSM 1-52
Dated: 20130403
Declassify Dn: 20330403
TOP
TOP ECR ETHSIHNO FORM
(U) Key Issues
(TSHSIHREL TO USA, FMEY) MOD RRD is interested in expanding the
relatibnship with NSAICSS. The MOD RRD seeks signals analysis equipment
upgrades, bapabilities and adyanbed training bn a wide range bf
tbpibs. While NSAICSS is able tb tb many bf their requests, sbme must
be denied due tb the fabt that they plabe sensitiye SIGINT equities at risk.
(TSHSIHN F) NSAICSS leadership anticipates a spring 2013 yisit tb Saudi Arabia
tb meet with TAD leadership tb disbuss burrent and future initiatiyes bf mutual
interest under the new relatibnship primary gbals the
partnership are:
1) (SHSIHREL TO USA, tb leyerage Saudi Arabia's strategib lbbatibn
and unique abbess tb bbmmunibatibns - e.g. al-Oa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AOAP) terrbrist abtiyity burrently accessible by ether means, and
2) (TSHSIHR EL TO USA, SAU) tb fabilitate the Saudi gbyernment's ability
tb utilize SIGINT tb lbbate and trabk indiyiduals bf mutual interest within Saudi
Arabia.
(U) What NSA Prbyides tb Partner
TO USA, SAU) NSAICSS prbyides tebhnibal adyibe bn SIGINT tbpibs
such as data eaplbitatibn and target deyelbpm ent tb TAD as well as a sensitive
sburbe bbllebtibn bapability.
(SHSIHREL TO USA, SAU) NSAICSS prbyides a sensitive seryibe tb
the Ministry bf Interibr against terrbrist targets bf mutual interest.
(U) What Partner Prbyides tb NSA
(SHSIHREL TO USA, SAU) NSA leyerages MOD RRD abbess tb rem bte
gebgraphy in the Arabian Gulfbut prbyides nb ?nished SIGINT repbrting tb
NSAICSS, hbweyer; they have prbyided bbllebtibn against the IRGC
Maritime Fbrbe targets bf mutual interest their bbllebtibn system-
(SHSIHREL TO USA, SAU) TAD prbyides sensitiye abbess tb unique bbllectibn
bbntaining AOAP terrbrist targets bfmutual interest.
Deriyed Frbm: NSAICSSM 1-52
Dated: 20130403
Deblassify On: 20330403
TOP SECRETHSIHNOFORN
TOP ECR ETHSIHNO FORM
(U) Key Issues
(TSHSIHREL TO USA, FMEY) MOD RRD is interested in expanding the
relatibnship with NSAICSS. The MOD RRD seeks signals analysis equipment
upgrades, bapabilities and adyanbed training bn a wide range bf
tbpibs. While NSAICSS is able tb tb many bf their requests, sbme must
be denied due tb the fabt that they plabe sensitiye SIGINT equities at risk.
(TSHSIHN F) NSAICSS leadership anticipates a spring 2013 yisit tb Saudi Arabia
tb meet with TAD leadership tb disbuss burrent and future initiatiyes bf mutual
interest under the new relatibnship primary gbals the
partnership are:
1) (SHSIHREL TO USA, tb leyerage Saudi Arabia's strategib lbbatibn
and unique abbess tb bbmmunibatibns - e.g. al-Oa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AOAP) terrbrist abtiyity burrently accessible by ether means, and
2) (TSHSIHR EL TO USA, SAU) tb fabilitate the Saudi gbyernment's ability
tb utilize SIGINT tb lbbate and trabk indiyiduals bf mutual interest within Saudi
Arabia.
(U) What NSA Prbyides tb Partner
TO USA, SAU) NSAICSS prbyides tebhnibal adyibe bn SIGINT tbpibs
such as data eaplbitatibn and target deyelbpm ent tb TAD as well as a sensitive
sburbe bbllebtibn bapability.
(SHSIHREL TO USA, SAU) NSAICSS prbyides a sensitive seryibe tb
the Ministry bf Interibr against terrbrist targets bf mutual interest.
(U) What Partner Prbyides tb NSA
(SHSIHREL TO USA, SAU) NSA leyerages MOD RRD abbess tb rem bte
gebgraphy in the Arabian Gulfbut prbyides nb ?nished SIGINT repbrting tb
NSAICSS, hbweyer; they have prbyided bbllebtibn against the IRGC
Maritime Fbrbe targets bf mutual interest their bbllebtibn system-
(SHSIHREL TO USA, SAU) TAD prbyides sensitiye abbess tb unique bbllectibn
bbntaining AOAP terrbrist targets bfmutual interest.
Deriyed Frbm: NSAICSSM 1-52
Dated: 20130403
Deblassify On: 20330403
TOP SECRETHSIHNOFORN
TOP 8 EUR ETHSIHNO FORM
(U) Success Steries
(SIESIHREL TO USA, SAU) with TAD en a sensitiye access has
early premise in prcducing SIGINT cfyalue tc the CT prcduct line.
(SHSIHREL TO USA, SAU) A mcderniaed HFDF senscr and HFDF antenna
system was installed in September 2012 at a MOD RRD lccaticn new Riyadh.
This FDF system replaces a legacy senscr that has been incperable fer an
extended pericd cftime and will signi?cantly regicnal HFDF
architecture.
(SHSIHREL TO USA, MOD RRD a Quick Reacticn Ca abilit
the in
the Arabian Gulf in tc a pctential threat IRGC OO DS Maritime
Fcrce. A sustained ccllecticn is planned ent in May 2013.
(U) with the Partner
(SHSIHREL TO USA, FUEY) The MOD RRD wculd like tc mcye expediticusly in
their mcderniaaticn tc include the acquisiticn cf additicnal SIGINT
capabilities. NSAICSS is cauticusly mcying fcrward with this partner and is net
necessarily ready tc mcye fcrward with initiatives that expcse sensitiye NSAICSS
SIGINT equities. This difference in strategic directicn will scmetimes be
atic and cause tensicn within the partnership.
NSAICSS has agreed tc ccllecticn cperaticns in Saudi
Arabia with Chief cf Staticn cf Riyadh in an tc prctect unilateral HUMINT
assets scrutiny.
(TSHSIHNF) NSAICSS dces expect the new relaticnship with TAD tc usurp cr
negatively impact existing relaticnship with the Ministry cf Defense
Fiadic Fieccnnaissance Department (MOD as MOD dces have
similar access tc internal Saudi teleccmmunicaticns.
(SHREL TO use, FUEY) Prepared by:
Saudi Arabian Desk Of?cer
Fcreign Affairs Directcrate, NSAICSS
NSTS
Deriyed Frcm: 1-52
Dated: 20130403
Declassify On: 20330403
TOP SECRETHSIHNOFORN
TOP 8 EUR ETHSIHNO FORM
(U) Success Steries
(SIESIHREL TO USA, SAU) with TAD en a sensitiye access has
early premise in prcducing SIGINT cfyalue tc the CT prcduct line.
(SHSIHREL TO USA, SAU) A mcderniaed HFDF senscr and HFDF antenna
system was installed in September 2012 at a MOD RRD lccaticn new Riyadh.
This FDF system replaces a legacy senscr that has been incperable fer an
extended pericd cftime and will signi?cantly regicnal HFDF
architecture.
(SHSIHREL TO USA, MOD RRD a Quick Reacticn Ca abilit
the in
the Arabian Gulf in tc a pctential threat IRGC OO DS Maritime
Fcrce. A sustained ccllecticn is planned ent in May 2013.
(U) with the Partner
(SHSIHREL TO USA, FUEY) The MOD RRD wculd like tc mcye expediticusly in
their mcderniaaticn tc include the acquisiticn cf additicnal SIGINT
capabilities. NSAICSS is cauticusly mcying fcrward with this partner and is net
necessarily ready tc mcye fcrward with initiatives that expcse sensitiye NSAICSS
SIGINT equities. This difference in strategic directicn will scmetimes be
atic and cause tensicn within the partnership.
NSAICSS has agreed tc ccllecticn cperaticns in Saudi
Arabia with Chief cf Staticn cf Riyadh in an tc prctect unilateral HUMINT
assets scrutiny.
(TSHSIHNF) NSAICSS dces expect the new relaticnship with TAD tc usurp cr
negatively impact existing relaticnship with the Ministry cf Defense
Fiadic Fieccnnaissance Department (MOD as MOD dces have
similar access tc internal Saudi teleccmmunicaticns.
(SHREL TO use, FUEY) Prepared by:
Saudi Arabian Desk Of?cer
Fcreign Affairs Directcrate, NSAICSS
NSTS
Deriyed Frcm: 1-52
Dated: 20130403
Declassify On: 20330403
TOP SECRETHSIHNOFORN
TOP 8 ECR ETHSIHNO FDRN
Derived Frum: 1-52
Dated: 20130403
Declassif}; On: 20380408
TOP SECRETHSIHNOFDRN
TOP 8 ECR ETHSIHNO FDRN
Derived Frum: 1-52
Dated: 20130403
Declassif}; On: 20380408
TOP SECRETHSIHNOFDRN